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Market and Regional Segmentation and Risk Premia 





We study market segmentation effects using data on U.S. railroads that list their bonds in New 
York and London between 1873 and 1913. This sample provides a unique setting for such analysis 
because of the precision offered by bond yields in cost of capital estimation, the geography-specific 
nature of railroad assets, and ongoing substantial technological change. We document a significant 
reduction in market segmentation over time. Whilst New York bond yields exceeded those in 
London in the 1870s, this premium disappeared by the early 1900s. However, the segmentation 
premium persisted in the more remote regions of the United States.  
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Geography has been characterized as playing an important role in capital market development. 
Distance can create frictions in connecting market participants, including explicit institutional 
barriers, physical exchange costs, as well as information and monitoring costs (e.g., Coval and 
Moskowitz, 1999, 2001; Hau, 2001; John, Knyazeva, and Knyazeva, 2011). Such geography-
related frictions can substantially segment markets, creating a premium on a firm’s cost of capital 
(see Solnik, 1974; Errunza and Losq, 1985; Merton, 1987), even if there are no formal restrictions 
on financial flows. 
The foreign listing decision is a particularly interesting laboratory to explore the relation 
between geography and finance as it represents a conscious choice by management to position the 
securities of the firm in a different geography for some benefit. One such potential benefit is that 
a firm may be able to issue securities at a better price in one market than another by enabling 
foreign investors, who may face considerable geography-related costs, to invest in the firm’s 
securities and share global risk, thereby reducing the cost of capital for the home firm (Alexander, 
Eun, and Janakiramanan, 1988; Foerster and Karolyi, 1999).1 While foreign listings have been 
used to measure the effects of market segmentation (Miller, 1999; Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; and 
Hail and Leuz, 2009), these tests have been criticized for the high estimation error inherent in 
measuring the cost of equity (Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan, 2001; Gozzi, Levine, and 
Schmukler, 2008; Sarkissian and Schill, 2009, 2016) and for being confounded with other effects 
of cross-listing such as gains in legal or financial disclosure (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004, 
2007).  
In this paper, we assess the market segmentation effects in a way that overcomes the 
challenges of past work by using a historical sample of U.S. railroad bonds listed in New York and 
London over the 1873 to 1913 period. We document that the yields of bonds listed in New York 
                                                        
1 Other motives for cross-listing include enhancing product visibility (Mittoo, 1992; Pagano, Roell, and Zechner, 
2002; Saudagaran, 1988), improving liquidity (Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan, 1998; Tinic and West, 1974; Werner 
and Kleidon, 1996), easing foreign firm acquisitions (Gangon and Karolyi, 2009), improving investor protection 
(Coffee, 1999, 2002; Doidge, 2004; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004, 2007, 2009; Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and 
Stulz, 2009; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Hail and Leuz, 2009; Reese and Weisbach, 2002), and familiarity links 
(Sarkissian and Schill, 2004). Sarkissian and Schill (2009) and King and Segal (2009) show that often cost of capital 
gains to a foreign listing are transitory. 
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maintained a premium over those listed in London. Furthermore, we examine the variation in this 
New York – London premium over time, and across domestic regions. We find that the premium 
declined over time as markets became less segmented: from 20 bp in the 1870s to almost zero by 
the 1900s. In addition, we find that, during crisis periods, borrowing costs rose for U.S. railroads 
in both markets but that there is no evidence of a London listing mitigating any crisis-induced 
increase in yields. In logistic regressions we observe that the magnitude of the yield difference is 
positively associated with the decision to list in London. 
We also compare our U.S. railroad sample to a control sample of British railroads. Whilst 
bond yields in London were 147 bp higher for U.S. railroads than for British railroads in the 1870s, 
this yield differential had declined to a statistically insignificant 26 bp by the 1900s. This yield 
convergence occurred as British investors increasingly diversified their portfolios overseas 
including the United States (Edelstein, 1982). 
Although we control for variation in relevant firm and bond characteristics of U.S. railroads 
when estimating the New York – London premium, our results may be contaminated by 
differences across the two samples. To allay this concern, we construct a sample of matched bond 
pairs where an identical U.S. railroad bond is traded in both New York and London. An example 
of such bonds is the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad which in 1898 issued a 50-year 4% Gold Bond 
that traded in both markets through the remainder of our sample period. We use the prices for this 
bond in both London and New York. Our matched sample consists of 69 bond pairs totaling 848 
firm years over the period 1875 to 1913. This sample begins in 1875 because very few matched 
bonds were traded on both markets before that date. The results from this matched sample confirm 
our full sample results with a positive New York – London premium for the matched bonds across 
the whole period and a similar decline to the end of the sample. 
One unique feature of our dataset is that railroads are easily defined geographically by the 
location of their assets and headquarters. We exploit this feature to sort railroads into four U.S. 
regions (NORTH, CENTRAL, SOUTH, and WEST, see Table 1 for definitions) to investigate 
regional variation in the cross-market premium. We find that the New York – London premium of 
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the matched bonds for firms from the SOUTH and WEST regions was 4 to 7 bp larger than for 
NORTH and CENTRAL railroads. This cross-regional difference in the New York – London 
premium remains the same in panel tests when controlling for bond characteristics. Hence, the cost 
of capital reduction following a London listing was greater for railroads located in the more remote 
regions of the United States, an effect that diminished little over time. Our explanation for this 
result is that firms in the SOUTH and WEST regions experienced stronger market segmentation 
than is the case for firms from the NORTH and CENTRAL regions. The observed market 
segmentation may be related to the relatively higher information costs faced by investors in 
screening and monitoring railroads in the more remote regions of the United States. Such 
information costs are relevant not by themselves but because they hindered the movement of 
capital that would normalize risk premia between various regions of the United States and London. 
Furthermore, the overall decline in segmentation effects, which we observe over time, is consistent 
with a fall in these information costs, for which we provide evidence taken from 
telecommunication rates.  
Our paper touches upon four sets of literature. First, we revisit the task of calculating the 
cost of capital gains from cross-listing (e.g., Miller, 1999; Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Doidge, 
Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004, 2007; and Hail and Leuz, 2009). By using corporate bond yields, our 
study minimizes the impact of confounding effects present in these previous equity-based studies 
on cost of capital estimation. Second, we add to the empirical work on the measurement of market 
segmentation. Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2007, 2011) estimate the effects of market 
segmentation using earnings yield (or its inverse, the P/E ratio). Although their approach is similar 
to ours, any comparison of equity earnings yield measures across countries runs into problems of 
varying growth rates both across markets and firms, and of different accounting standards for 
computing earnings. Our measure of segmentation focuses on bond rather than equity yields and 
avoids many of these problems. Third, our finding that two matched securities trade at different 
prices in two markets references an extant literature that finds price differences across markets in 
stocks offering identical cash flows (e.g., Rosenthal and Young, 1990; Froot and Dabora, 1999; 
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De Jong, Rosenthal, and Van Dijk, 2009; Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010). We extend this literature by 
adding an additional example – price differences between cross-listed bonds – and show that bonds 
with identical cash flow promises can trade at different prices in different markets depending on 
the degree of market segmentation. Finally, we use a unique setting by examining U.S. railroad 
cross-listings in London in an earlier period similar to studies of cross-listings of English stocks in 
Amsterdam in the 18th century (Koudijs, 2015; Neal, 1990) to better understand how capital 
markets function. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data. Section 2 
estimates the impact of U.S. railroad bond listings in London on the cost of capital. Section 3 
analyses a sample of matched railroad bonds listed in both New York and London. It also discusses 
cross-regional differences in borrowing costs. Section 4 explains the time-series and cross-regional 
patterns in the cost of capital of U.S. railroads. Section 5 concludes. 
 
1. Data and Summary Statistics 
1.1 Sample Motivation 
Our analysis of market segmentation effects focuses on a historical (1873-1913) sample of U.S. 
railroads for five reasons. First, the pre-World War I period is one of emerging globalization of 
world capital markets (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Evidence of this trend is provided in this period 
by the popularity among U.S. firms of listing their corporate securities in London.2 In our sample, 
the proportion of U.S. railroads with a London bond listing exceeds 50%, suggesting that the 
tendency to list abroad at that time was much greater than for the well-studied samples from the 
late 20th and early 21st centuries.3 This period of high foreign listing activity among U.S. firms 
coincides with massive investment in the domestic railroad network. Figure 1 illustrates this 
                                                        
2 Only six railroads were listed in London prior to the Civil War (Adler, 1970: 53, 153). London listings grew rapidly 
from the 1870s. By 1913, U.S. railroads accounted for half of the aggregate British investor portfolio compared to a 
37% index weight (Goetzmann and Ukhov, 2006: Table XI). 
3 The overall proportion of foreign to domestic bond listings in our sample exceeds 0.5. In contrast, the fraction of 
cross-listed stocks among the S&P 500 index companies was on average only about 0.2 in the second half of the 20th 
century (see Jiao and Sarkissian, 2015). 
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network growth through the U.S. railroad maps in 1870, 1880, and 1890. According to Davis and 
Galman (2001), “…in terms of economic development, the construction of the national railway 
network was probably the most important event of the last half of the nineteenth century” and 
required “a massive infusion of capital”. The importance of British investors in such funding made 
the London Stock Exchange the major foreign listing venue for U.S. railroads (Wilkins, 1989: 200-
201). In addition, the advent of the telegraph sparked a dramatic reduction in transatlantic 
information transmission costs from the late 1860s. This major technology shock was critical to 
the integration of the New York and London capital markets over this period (Garbade and Silber, 
1978; Hoag, 2006). 
Second, unlike today, bonds, not equities, dominated the portfolios of British and other 
foreign investors in this period (Wilkins, 1989: 191; Chambers and Esteves, 2014). Hence, the 
higher incidence of bond listings over stock listings in 1873-1913 helps us exploit the greater 
precision of bond yields over equity costs when estimating the cost of capital. Bond contracts, 
unlike equities, clearly specify expected cash payments. Cost of debt estimates are more immune 
to model specification error and risk premium estimation error than cost of equity estimates. 
Moreover, given the heavy reliance on bond finance throughout the period of our study, debt 
represents the most important component of the cost of capital.  
 Third, investor protection laws were equally weak on both sides of the Atlantic during our 
study period, and listing regulations of the London and New York Stock Exchanges were minimal 
(Coffee, 2001).4 While cross-country differences in financial reporting, legal liability standards, 
and listing requirements can create large variation in bonding effects when considering cross 
listings today (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004; Miller and Puthenpurackal, 2002, 2005), such 
effects are substantially less during our sample period.  
                                                        
4 If anything, New York was tougher in screening listing applications than was London (Michie, 1987: 256-257). 
Similarly, U.S. investment banks in New York were more active than their British counterparts in London playing the 
honest broker between U.S. railroads and British investors (Coffee, 2001). 
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Fourth, product markets have been shown to have important implications for foreign listing 
(Pagano, Roell, and Zechner, 2002). Yet, there is no concern about the contaminating effects of 
product market exports in our setting, since railroad assets are geographically defined by nature. 
A similar argument makes the acquisition facilitation motive irrelevant to our study (Gagnon and 
Karolyi, 2009).  
Fifth, the substantial cross-regional variation in U.S. economic development in this period 
facilitates our analysis of within-market regional segmentation effects. This variation across 
regions was driven by the country’s vast size, the rise of a manufacturing belt, westward expansion, 
and the legacy of the Civil War weighing heavily on the economy of the South. The geographically 
defined nature of railroad assets and their headquarters permits the allocation of our sample firms 
into defined regions. Employing these regional samples, we investigate the impact of within-
country capital market segmentation on the cost of capital and how this varies over time.   
In identifying bonds we focus on the London and New York stock exchanges. The New 
York Stock Exchange was the most important exchange in the United States through this period 
and railroads constituted the largest and most heavily traded industry (Michie, 1987: 197). The 
London Stock Exchange was a substantially larger market and was the most developed stock 
market in the world at this time. By the end of our sample, London’s stock market capitalization 
to GDP ratio was 450% compared to 230% for New York (Hannah, 2015). Railroads also 
represented the largest listed sector on the London market (Grossman, 2002: Table 1). Whilst today 
emerging market firms look to cross-list on the world’s most developed stock market, New York; 
in our sample period U.S. firms looked to London for their cross-listing benefits.  
 
1.2 Sample Construction 
We construct a dataset of U.S. railroad bonds listed on the New York Stock Exchange or the 
London Stock Exchange between 1873 and 1913. At the time, bonds were listed and traded on the 
floors of both the New York and London stock exchanges. Both exchanges and their respective 
financial press published price lists of bonds and stocks which were widely available to investors 
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– mainly wealthy individuals. These price lists are published in the Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle for New York, and the Investors Monthly Manual and the Stock Exchange Daily Official 
List for London. We require that all sample bonds have security price data included in one or more 
of these lists. U.S. railroads could achieve a London listing of a bond already listed in New York 
with or without a prospectus issue in London. In the case of a listing via a prospectus issue, bond 
prices quoted in the London lists require adjustment to be directly comparable with New York 
bond prices (Huebner, 1922, 87-98; Nelson, 1904, 53-54).5 
In addition, we require that sample firms have financial statements in the Poor’s Manual 
of the Railroads of the United States, which is the most comprehensive annual survey of U.S. 
railroad companies during our sample period. Using the descriptions in the Poor’s Manual, we 
exclude railroads that are headquartered outside of the United States or are subsidiaries of another 
company. The total number of firms in the sample is 196 which we believe captures the bulk of 
U.S. railroad assets at the time. As a control sample, we obtain a separate sample of British 
railroads that are listed in London during the same period. This list is obtained through the 
Investors Monthly Manual. 
We assign each U.S. firm to a particular region based on the location of the firm’s 
headquarters, which is listed in the Poor’s Manual usually as the Principal Office. We use region 
definitions outlined by the Poor’s Manual. Naturally, the region definitions change over time as 
the United States develops geographically. For example, in the 1870s, the Poor’s Manual defines 
the Western region as everything west of and including Ohio. From the late 1880s onwards, Poor’s 
adopts a static regional definition. We opt to use this later regional classification for our sample, 
and then aggregate the eight Poor’s Manual regions into four broader regions. For example, the 
                                                        
5 London price quotes of dollar-denominated U.S. railroad bonds issued in London by way of a prospectus typically 
made the exchange rate assumption of $5.00 to the pound sterling – the exceptions being before 1878, when the 
assumed rate was below $5.00 to the pound. To correct for this convention, we adjust the prices of these bonds. The 
adjustment factor is the ratio of the prevailing dollar/sterling exchange rate to the assumed exchange rate e.g., $5.00. 
Under the de facto gold standard, from the end of 1878, when the prevailing exchange rate was around $4.87, London 
prices published in the price lists are multiplied by an adjustment factor of 0.975. Before 1878, when the prevailing 
exchange rate ranged above $5.00, London prices are multiplied by an adjustment factor above one, specifically 1.12 




New England and Middle states are combined to form the NORTH region. Table 1 provides the 
details of the regional classification. Of the 196 railroads, the NORTH, CENTRAL, SOUTH, and 
WEST regions have 50, 58, 32, and 56 firms, respectively. 
Using the security listings in the Investors Monthly Manual, we identify those U.S. 
railroads that are listed in London. In Table 2, we show a frequency distribution of U.S. railroad 
bond and common stock listings in New York and London by geographic regions. We observe that 
bonds were the most common type of security listed for the full sample and across all U.S. regions. 
Among the 143 railroads quoted on the New York Stock Exchange, 131 listed at least one bond 
compared to only 90 that listed their common stock. Similarly, among the 117 U.S. railroads 
quoted on the London Stock Exchange according to the Investors Monthly Manual, all 117 firms 
listed at least one of their bonds and only 40 listed their common stock. To explore the sequencing 
of security listing, we give the ratio of firms that listed a bond before a stock in each market in the 
column entitled “Bond First.” In New York, 71% of the firms listed a bond before their equity, 
while in London this fraction is 95%. The focus of this paper is on the bond listings. 
Figure 2 reports for each year the number of U.S. railroads with bonds listed in both New 
York and London, and the number of British railroads with bonds listed in London. The number 
of U.S. railroads listed in New York increases steadily from 27 in 1873 to a peak of 113 by 1890, 
then drops over the next decade and slowly declines to 67 listings in 1913. As for U.S. railroads 
listed in London, their number continues to increase until 1895 with 90 listings, then drops to 
around 55 listings by the 1900s. Our control sample of British railroads listed in London 
experiences much less variation with a slow rise from 26 listings in 1873 to 51 listings at the peak 
in 1901 and 1902, then a decline to 36 by 1913. The end-of-sample decreases in the number of 
railroads on both exchanges are due largely to consolidating mergers within the industry. 
The proportion of U.S. railroads with a London bond listing relative to all railroads listed 
in both markets varies across region over the sample period. The NORTH railroads retained the 
highest cross-listing proportion at about 70%, particularly in the 1870s and 1880s. The CENTRAL 
railroads had the lowest proportion of bonds listed in London at only 40-50% throughout the 
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sample period. In contrast, the proportion of railroads from SOUTH and WEST with a London 
bond listing remained below 50% up until the late 1880s, with both regions catching up with the 
NORTH in the 1890s. 
 
1.3 Firm and Bond Characteristics 
For each railroad in the sample, we collect data on five firm characteristics from financial 
statements reported in the Poor’s Manual from 1873 to 1913: revenue (Revenue), total assets 
(Assets), revenue growth (Revenue growth), asset growth (Asset growth), and return on assets 
(ROA). Revenue is defined as total revenue across all firm operations, and is frequently called 
‘gross earnings’ in the financial statements of the time. Revenue growth (Asset growth) is the total 
revenue (assets) divided by the lagged revenue (assets) less unity. ROA is the difference between 
total revenue and total operating expenses divided by lagged total assets. To reduce the impact of 
outliers, we winsorize the growth rates and ROA at the 1% and 99% level. In total, we obtain 
between 3,601 and 4,157 firm-year observations depending on the availability of particular data 
items in the Poor’s Manuals. For British railroads, we are only able to collect one firm 
characteristic measure. We define a size measure (assets) as the sum of book debt and equity 
capital as reported in the Investors Monthly Manual and the Stock Exchange Year Book and convert 
this value to U.S. dollars at an exchange rate of USD4.87 = GBP1.  
Table 3 summarizes the statistics of railroad company characteristics. Panel A reports their 
frequency and averages for U.S. railroads listed only in New York, U.S. railroads listed only in 
London, U.S. railroads listed in both New York and London, and British railroads listed in London. 
The U.S. railroads listed only in London are slightly larger and have lower operating returns than 
those listed only in New York. The U.S. railroads that listed in both markets have substantially 
larger revenue and assets. This size bias is consistent with more recent samples of cross-listing 
firms (see Sarkissian and Schill, 2012). The size of the British railroads appears comparable to that 
of the average U.S. railroad. In Panel B, we look at cross-regional differences in firm 
characteristics. The railroads from NORTH are the most profitable (ROA=5.5%) and generate the 
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most revenue. Those from WEST lead in growth and asset size which is not surprising due to the 
region’s geographic size and its need for more railroad tracks. The railroads from SOUTH and 
WEST are the least profitable (ROA=4.2% and 3.9%, respectively). 
To measure cross-market differences in the cost of capital we collect end-of-year bond 
prices for the sample over the 1873 to 1913 period.  New York prices are obtained from the 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle and London prices from both the Investors Monthly Manual 
and the Stock Exchange Daily Official List. Prices are quoted including accrued interest, except 
for New York bonds from 1909 onwards due to a change in the way bond prices are reported in 
the Commercial and Financial Chronicle. We adjust these prices for accrued interest. Next, we 
compute annual bond yields by dividing the bond coupon payment by the prevailing end-of-year 
bond price. Where a railroad had more than one bond listed, we select the bond with the longest 
maturity such that each firm has only one annual observation. To avoid variation in yields due to 
variation in maturity, bonds are only included if the bond had at least 10 years to maturity. In order 
to mitigate liquidity concerns, we exclude bonds where prices are not available in at least six 
months in the calendar year including the month of December. 
Since bond rating agencies did not exist until the end of our study period, we are unable to 
use the bond credit rating as a control variable. Instead, we control for variation in bond and firm 
characteristics using the existing bond descriptions in the (London) Stock Exchange Year Books 
and the Poor’s Manuals and firm financial data. As Skeel (2001, p.59) and Tufano (1995) make 
clear, first mortgage bondholders were regarded as senior claimants in any reorganization. To 
reduce variation in bond seniority, we exclude any bond that is not a first, consolidated, or general 
mortgage bond, where the mortgage constituted a senior claim on the track, rolling stock, or other 
fixed asset of the railroad or its equivalent. Accordingly, we omit second, third, and lower-ranked 
mortgage bonds as well as any bond where we could not ascertain that the quality of the collateral 
was equivalent to a first, consolidated, or general mortgage.  
The predictable cash flow advantages of bonds when estimating the cost of capital 
disappear once firms face financial distress. As a first screen, we control for financial distress by 
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omitting yield observations above 12%. This screen omits 26 bond-year observations from our 
sample with yields ranging from 13% to 78%. This threshold of 12% while admittedly arbitrary 
was chosen to remove the obvious outliers in the distribution of yields. We impose an additional 
credit risk screen by excluding those yield observations that exceed one standard deviation above 
the annual mean yield. This sample restriction serves to increase our confidence of the unlikeliness 
that our findings are due to systematic variation in credit risk.  
Our final sample of U.S railroad bonds includes 114 firms and 3,003 firm years. This 
sample is somewhat larger than that used by Benmelech (2009) and Macaulay (1938).6 Our sample 
of British railroad bonds includes 60 firms and 1,609 firm years. We consider several bond 
characteristic variables. The U.S. dollar was on the gold standard until its suspension during the 
Civil War and returned to it in 1879.7 Nonetheless, some investors preferred the security of bonds 
paying interest and principal in gold or sterling, rather than in U.S. dollars.8 Hence, we employ 
two indicator variables. The first indicator (Gold) equals unity if the principal and the coupons on 
the bond were payable in gold, and zero otherwise; the second (Sterling) equals unity if the 
principal and the coupons on the bond were payable in pounds sterling, and zero otherwise. We 
also include several other bond characteristics. Default dummy is equal to unity in any year a 
railroad is in default on its bonds, and zero otherwise. Years-to-Maturity is the years left to bond 
maturity. For the British railroad sample, the Years-to-Maturity is set at 100 years since virtually 
all British bonds were issued as perpetual bonds (Coyle and Turner, 2013). Since all the bonds in 
our sample are secured bonds, we do not include a variable to capture variation in borrowing costs 
for secured versus unsecured debt. The data on the Gold, Sterling, and Years-to-Maturity variables 
                                                        
6 Benmelech (2009) covers 212 railroads but only 390 firm-year observations in four selected years between 1868 and 
1882. Over our study period, the Macaulay (1938) sample comprises 69 railroads. The average bond yield in our 
sample is 4.8% and ranges from 3.2% to 8.9%. These values are comparable to Macaulay’s estimated average of 4.5% 
ranging between 3.9% and 8.0%.   
7 Although the U.S. had adopted a bimetallic standard for its currency in 1792, the mint ratio overvalued gold such 
that by 1849 the United States was on a de facto gold standard. Convertibility was suspended during the Civil War. 
The dollar de facto returned to the gold standard in 1879 and was exchangeable at a fixed exchange rate of $4.87/£1 
(Bordo and Rockoff, 1996: 401). In some specifications, we control for this change in regimes by adding a pre-1879 
fixed effect, OffGold, and an interaction variable between the OffGold and the Sterling dummy variables. 
8 Currency hedging has been identified as a reason for the issuing of foreign currency denominated debt (see Kedia 
and Mozumdar, 2003; Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach, 2006). 
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are drawn from the (London) Stock Exchange Daily Official Lists, the (London) Stock Exchange 
Year Books and the Poor’s Manuals. We compute the bond yield spread, which equals the bond 
yield less the prevailing yield on the long-dated British government bond obtained from Coyle and 
Turner (2013). 
Investment banks played an increasingly prominent role in underwriting railroad bond 
issues in our study period in much the same way that they do for major equity listings today. 
Underwriting relationships were important in improving access to external finance in the early 
twentieth century (Simon, 1998, Ramirez, 1995, Frydman and Hilt, 2017). In the absence of 
comprehensive data on the underwriting relationships for all our railroads across the whole sample 
period (and not just at the very end of the period) and on bank reputation, our analysis does not 
take account of such relationships.9 
Panel B of Table 3 shows the average bond characteristics across U.S. regions over the 
sample period. Companies from SOUTH and WEST have a larger proportion of their bonds 
granting investors the right to be paid in gold than those from NORTH and CENTRAL (0.64 and 
0.64 versus 0.59 and 0.37). This may imply that the insertion of a gold clause was a way of making 
the SOUTH and WEST bonds more attractive to investors. Reflecting our attempts to cleanse our 
sample of financial distress, only 1.4% of bond-year observations experienced a default and with 
little regional variation. The U.S. bonds have average years to maturity of 46 years, and exhibit 
relatively little variation across regions. Railroads from NORTH have the lowest average bond 
yields and, as a result, the lowest spreads over British Government bonds. 
 
2. Cost of Capital Effects of Bond Listings in London 
2.1 Preliminary Evidence 
                                                        
9 As an exploratory test, we run all our tests in the paper with a control for those railroads that had a relation with J.P. 
Morgan following Ramirez (1995). While unreported due to the incompleteness in the bank relationship variable, we 
find no evidence of any correlation of our test variables with a Morgan connection. 
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We start by examining the time-series variation in yield spreads over British government bonds of 
U.S. railroad bonds traded in the United States and Britain, and of British railroads traded in 
London. Table 4 shows for each year and decade the mean yield spread of each group. Over the 
sample period, we observe a decrease in U.S. railroad bond yield spreads from 3.22% to close to 
1.16%. In contrast, British railroad yield spreads exhibit a more modest decline over time from a 
mean yield spread of 0.95% down to 0.66% in the 1900s (albeit the yield spread is somewhat lower 
in the middle of the sample period).  
Table 4 also shows the difference in mean yield spreads between New York and London 
listed U.S. bonds (New York – London), between London listed U.S. bonds and British bonds 
(U.S. – British, London), as well as the statistical significance of this difference in means. The 
mean yields for U.S. bonds listed in New York were systematically higher than those listed in 
London. This premium is often statistically and economically significant (particularly at the level 
of decade aggregation). Second, the premium declined over time. In the 1870s and 1880s, the 
prevailing yield for U.S. railroads listed in New York was larger by 40 and 21 bp, respectively, 
those of U.S. railroads listed in London. This premium declined to less than 10 bp in the 1890s 
and 1900s. A comparison between the British and American railroads traded in London shows that 
British investors in American railroads received a 187 bp premium in the 1870s that declined to 
below 30 bp in the last five years of our sample period. The variation in premia across these three 
samples is consistent with market segmentation effects. 
 
2.2 Full Sample Tests 
We now examine market segmentation effects more rigorously by controlling for variation in firm 
and bond characteristics. In our first set of regressions, we test for the impact of a London bond 
listing on bond yield spreads (Spread) after accounting for both firm and bond characteristics. 
Accordingly, we construct an indicator variable, FBondi,t, which is equal to unity if firm i has a 
bond listed in London in year t, and zero otherwise. Therefore, our regression model is:  
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,           (1) 
where Firm_Chari,t-1 are firm characteristics, such as Log (Assets), ROA, and Asset Growth, 
Bond_Chari,t-1 are bond characteristics, such as Gold, Sterling, Default, and Years-to-Maturity. 
These variables are summarized in Table 3. The last two terms denote firm and time fixed effects. 
We also include controls for London bonds with end-of-year coupon dates (we define a variable 
Ex-Day for bonds with coupon dates within a few weeks of the end of the year), as well as the 
OffGold dummy for the pre-1879 period when the U.S. dollar was not yet fixed against gold.  
Table 5 reports our test results using the full sample of U.S. railroads with various 
specifications. The first specification includes FBond and the four bond-specific variables, as well 
as year fixed effects. The coefficient on FBond is negative 12 bp and significant, indicating that 
prevailing yields in London were significantly lower than in New York. Regression (2) adds three 
firm characteristic controls: Log (Assets), Asset Growth, and ROA. This addition lowers the 
FBond coefficient slightly to 11 bp, and the coefficient retains its high statistical significance.  In 
this regression, the coefficient on Sterling is negative and significant suggesting that bonds with 
sterling denomination experienced lower yields. The coefficient on Default is positive and 
significant consistent with bonds of firms that have defaulted maintaining higher yields. The 
coefficient on Years-to-Maturity is negative, possibly suggesting that longer maturity is associated 
with better reputation. The firm characteristics of asset size and profitability are negative and 
significant, implying that bonds issued by larger and more profitable companies maintained lower 
borrowing costs. The coefficient on Asset Growth is insignificantly different from zero.  
Regression (3) adds firm fixed effects to control for any omitted firm characteristics. This 
inclusion reduces the coefficient on FBond to 6 bp, yet retaining its high significance. Regression 
(4) replaces year fixed effects with a time trend, Time. In this specification, we also estimate the 
time trend in the New York – London premium by including the interaction term, FBond × Time. 















on the interaction term suggests that this premium declined on average by 0.8 bp per year over the 
40 years of the sample. Both coefficients are statistically highly significant.  
Given evidence of strong time-series effects, we next consider how the segmentation 
effects are affected by financial crisis periods. Accordingly, in Regression (5) we add a crisis 
variable, Crisis, and its interaction with FBond. The crisis variable is taken from the annual default 
rates for U.S. railroads in Figure 1 by Giesecke, Longstaff, Schaefer, and Strebulaev (2011). It is 
meant to model the time-varying credit-market conditions in the United States. The positive and 
significant coefficient associated with the Crisis dummy implies, as expected, that during 
economic and financial downturns U.S. bond yield spreads increased in both markets. However, 
we are unable to find evidence that a London bond listing helped in mitigating the negative effects 
of increased borrowing costs during financial crises (the coefficient on FBond × Crisis is 
insignificant). This result is consistent with a study that uses a more recent sample period, which 
also finds no cost of capital benefit during financial crisis periods for firms cross-listed in the 
United States (Chandara, Patrob, and Yezegel, 2009). In unreported tests, we find a similar result 
when replacing our financial crisis variable with an economic crisis variable represented by 
NBER-defined recession periods. 
In Regression (6) of Table 5, we further refine our analysis by including decade fixed 
effects (1870s, 1880s, 1890s, and 1900s as defined in Table 4) to summarize the time trend. We 
also continue to include firm fixed effects to control for any omitted firm characteristics. We 
interact the four decade dummies with FBond to estimate the foreign listing gain in each of these 
time intervals of the sample. We find that the interaction coefficient for FBond in the 1870s is 
negative 20 bp, with a t-statistic of 3.21. The decade coefficients then decline in magnitude to 18 
bp in the 1880s and 4 bp in the 1890s. The latter coefficient in the 1900s is effectively zero and is 
not statistically significant. 10  Thus, our estimations in Table 5 confirm a decline in market 
                                                        
10 We also tested for the impact of a stock listing on yield spreads, but it did not materially change our results. 
Furthermore, we consider the possibility that yield spreads might be explained by liquidity in both the London and 




segmentation in that a listing of a U.S. railroad bond in London during our sample period is linked 
with systematically lower bond yield spreads, and that this difference disappeared over time.  11 
Continuing this same vein of analysis, we examine the magnitude of the gain to British 
investors from diversifying into U.S. railroad securities from a position in the first half of our study 
period where their portfolios were dominated by British railroad securities (Mitchell, Chambers 
and Crafts, 2011). Combining our sample of London-listed U.S. railroad bonds with our control 
sample of British railroad bonds reported in Tables 3 and 4 above, we run a regression of bond 
yield spreads on decade dummies and firm and bond characteristics similar to those reported in 
Table 5 (results not reported). The coefficients on the decade dummies imply that London investors 
in our sample of U.S. railroad bonds receive an additional 147 bp over the yield prevailing on 
British railroad bonds and that this premium declined by the 1900s to 26 bp, statistically 
insignificant from zero. Based on the point estimates, this implies that the total difference between 
bond yields on British railroads in London and U.S. railroads in New York is 168 bp (147 bp + 21 
bp) in the 1870s and the same 26 bp (26 bp + 0 bp) in the 1900s. Hence, as the two markets became 
less segmented and British investors became more diversified, this yield premium disappeared. 
 
2.3 Determinants of Cross-Listing in London 
A prior literature discusses how capital flows between markets can help normalize risk premia 
(Stein, 1996; Greenwood, Hanson, and Liao, 2015). Such flows can come not only from the 
investor side, but also, from the firm side through listings, which “arbitrage” differential risk 
premia across markets. In other words, the propensity of U.S. firms to list in London might be 
related to the observed premium of bond yield spreads of New York versus London listed railroads. 
To examine whether such a relation exists as well as to identify other possible determinants of the 
                                                        
in our sample for years 1890 and 1913 from the Commercial and Financial Chronicle and the Stock Exchange Daily 
Official List respectively. The average spread on U.S. railroads in London is 2.4% in 1890 and 2.8% in 1913, whereas 
that for railroads in New York is 2.0% in the same two years. These differences are not significant. 
11 Similar estimates of the FBond coefficients in Table 5 are obtained if Log(Assets) and Asset Growth are substituted 
with Revenue and Revenue Growth.  
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decision of U.S. railroads to cross-list their bonds in London, we employ the following logistic 
(logit) regression model: 
,   (2) 
where P(Londoni,t) is the probability that the dependent indicator variable equals one in year t 
when railroad i becomes listed in London, and zero otherwise.  
Firm_Chari,t is the same set of firm characteristics used in Equation (1). In this case, 
however, we select only those firm-specific variables where economic intuition suggests that they 
are likely to be related to foreign listing intensity. They include Asset Growth, ROA, and Default, 
which are discussed above and summarized in Table 3. We also consider an indicator variable, 
NYSE_Listing, that takes the value of unity if the firm already had an NYSE bond listing, and 
zero otherwise. 
Market_Chart consists of country and cross-country market characteristics, including the 
change in the average annual difference in U.S. railroad bond yield spreads between New York 
and London, Diff (New York – London), and the change in the average annual difference 
between the yields of U.S. and British railroad bonds listed in London, Diff (U.S. – British), both 
from Table 4, as well as our U.S. Crisis (annual default rates for U.S. railroads) variable. We also 
account for the change in the ratio of the GDP of the United States to that of the United Kingdom, 
GDP(U.S.)/GDP(U.K.). This reflects the relative economic growth of the two countries.  
Region_Chari,t has two regional controls. The first one, Region_Track_Growth, is the 
annual growth rate in total railroad track mileage of the U.S. region where the railroad is located. 
We suspect that the stronger was growth in the railroad track mileage in a region, the more likely 
were local capital availability constraints to push firms into considering a foreign financing. The 
second, SW_1870s, is a dummy variable that equals one for U.S. railroads originating from the 
SOUTH and WEST regions of the United States in the 1870s, and is zero otherwise. This variable 























and South West U.S. railroads until the 1880s (Adler, 1970: 192). All independent variables are 
lagged by one year. 
 Table 6 shows the estimation results of our logit regressions. In parentheses, we provide 
for each coefficient estimate the corresponding Wald chi-square statistic. Regression (1) contains 
only firm characteristics. We observe that U.S. railroads tended to list in London when asset 
growth was strong. More interestingly, we also find a negative and significant coefficient on 
NYSE_Listing implying that a prior listing in the home market is associated with a lower 
likelihood of a subsequent listing in London. This suggests a possible substitution effect in listing 
venue that, disregarding other factors, a U.S. listing may on its own have provided sufficient capital 
raising opportunity for some U.S. railroads and decreased the likelihood of listing abroad. 
Regression (2) of Table 6 replaces firm characteristics with market and regional variables. 
In this estimation, the loadings on Diff (New York – London) and Region_Track_Growth are 
both positive and highly significant. The coefficient on the first of these two variables suggests 
that a larger change in the yield difference between U.S. bonds listed in London and British bonds 
is associated with an increase in listing activity in London by U.S. firms. This relation is consistent 
with corporate arbitrage in that U.S. railroads in a search for cheaper debt financing expanded their 
listing activity in London in response to increasing yield spread difference. The positive coefficient 
on the second variable implies an increasing likelihood of U.S. railroads from regions experiencing 
higher regional track mileage growth seeking a London listing to address the greater need for 
sources of capital outside their local capital market. Finally, the coefficient on SOUTH and WEST 
railroads in the 1870s, SW_1870s, is negative and marginally significant, consistent with the claim 
that British investors preferred not to invest in railroads from these regions in the early years.  
In Regressions (3-4) of Table 6, we include all firm, market, and regional controls. 
Regression (3) does not control for firm fixed effects, while Regression (4) does. The firm fixed 
effect controls for any omitted firm characteristics related to the firm’s propensity to list in London. 
As before, among firm-specific variables, we find significantly positive coefficients on Asset 
Growth and a significantly negative coefficient on NYSE_Listing. After controlling for firm fixed 
19 
 
effects Region_Track_Growth loses its statistical importance but its point estimate declines less 
dramatically. Among all other market and regional variables, only Diff (New York – London) 
retains its sign and high statistical significance.  
Overall, we conclude from Table 6 that there is evidence that U.S. firms had the opportunity 
through cross-listings in London to exploit lower borrowing costs in the United Kingdom. Why 
then do we not observe U.S. railroads seeking to refinance their entire debt by issuing securities 
only in the lower cost market? The absence of such wholesale refinancing activity is similar to 
findings in existing studies showing that firms today do not completely refinance all their debt 
when faced with borrowing opportunities.12 Rather, firms save a few basis points on current 
funding requirements by restructuring their new borrowing in a particular way. However, such 
savings are not sufficient to justify refinancing all of their debt. Just as modern firms rarely 
refinance their entire debt portfolio in response to a market opportunity, debt cost savings available 
to our sample firms are likely not sufficient to justify the additional costs of switching all debt 
financing to a foreign market. Thus, U.S. railroad firms used these opportunities simply to fund 
their current borrowing needs.13 
  
3. The Matched Bond Sample Analysis  
3.1 Overall Tests 
                                                        
12 Friedman (1979), Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003), and Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2010) examine the 
choice between short-term and long-term debt. Faulkender (2005) and Chernenko and Faulkender (2006) consider the 
choice between fixed and floating-rate debt issuance. Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2004) examine the registration 
decision of international borrowers with respect to public debt versus Rule 144A debt. Johnson (1988), Allayannis, 
Brown, and Klapper (2003), Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2006), McBrady and Schill (2007) and McBrady, 
Mortal, and Schill (2010) look at the choice of currency denomination in bond offerings with respect to exploiting 
deviations from interest rate parity 
13 The example of the Chesapeake and Ohio (C&O) Railroad bonds in our sample illustrates the slow-moving nature 
of corporate arbitrage. Although these bonds do not represent all of the bonds in issue for the C&O railroad over the 
sample period, they do represent all of the C&O bonds in our sample. The first bond is the 6% 1911 bond issued in 
1882 in New York. On January 1, 1889, the C&O railroad issued a 5% 1939 bond in both London and New York. 
Although this bond has a lower coupon rate, the 6% 1911 bond remains outstanding to maturity. In 1895, C&O issues 
another bond with a lower coupon rate, the 100-year 1992 4.5% bond.  This bond is also issued in both London and 
New York. Despite the lower coupon rate, the existing 5% 1939 bond continues to remain in C&O’s capital structure. 
The 4.5% 1992 bond maintains prices in both London and New York through 1913, the end of the sample. In this 
example, there is little evidence that C&O is systematically refinancing its entire outstanding funded debt despite 
lower borrowing rates. 
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To allay concerns that our full-sample results can be explained by variation in firm or bond 
characteristics, we repeat our analysis on a matched sample of 69 paired bonds (848 bond-year 
observations), where the same bond was listed in both New York and in London at the same time. 
This has the advantage of controlling for any systematic variation in risk across the New York-
listed and London-listed U.S. railroads. The matching process is laborious because the descriptions 
of the railroad bonds listed in the Commercial and Financial Chronicle (New York) and the 
Investors Monthly Matching or Stock Exchange Price Lists (London) are abbreviated in different 
ways and require careful checking in the Poors manuals and the Stock Exchange Year Books to 
establish a match. Among the 69 paired bonds contained in the matched bond sample, 65 pairs 
were fungible; the remaining four bonds were sterling-denominated in London and dollar-
denominated in New York. Unlike for the full sample, we include more than one (paired) bond per 
railroad. Hence, our matched sample comprises 45 railroads.  
Figure 3 graphs the frequency distribution of the number of railroads with a matched bond 
in each sample year (Plot A) and then the average yield premium of New York-listed over London-
listed bonds for this matched sub-sample at the end of each year (Plot B). Our analysis starts in 
1875, when the number of railroad bonds with a listing on both exchanges reached at least five. 
This start date is also consistent with the inception date for Wilkins (1989) – the major historical 
study of foreign investment in U.S. railroads. Figure 3 shows that the premium diminished over 
time from about 20 bp in the early 1870s to less than 5 bp in the 1890s and remained at this low 
level until the end of the sample period. This time trend is similar to that reported in Table 5. The 
average premium over the whole sample of matched bonds was 7 bp – a level consistent with the 
Fbond coefficient result reported in Table 5 Regression (3). 
The evidence from the matched bond sample confirms the important role of market 
segmentation effects. That is, we show that when investment capital is segmented, cross-market 
securities can trade at different prices in equilibrium. 
 
3.2 Regional Tests 
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Previous empirical studies suggest that cross-listing benefits for firms from emerging markets are 
larger than for those from developed markets (e.g., Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Doidge, Karolyi, 
and Stulz, 2004). This variation in cross-listing benefits, among other things, may reflect 
differences in bonding effects, disparities in economic development, and access to capital markets. 
Our data set provides a unique opportunity to explore this literature due to the geography-specific 
nature of railroad assets. Unlike most firms where it is difficult to define the geography of the 
business cleanly, railroad firms own assets and the associated operating revenue attaching to a 
specific location. For example, during our sample period the Colorado and Southern Railway 
Company generated all of its operating revenue on lines that were localized in three states in the 
WEST: Colorado, New Mexico, and Wyoming. At the same time, the Lehigh Valley Railroad 
Company generated all of its operating revenue on lines that were localized in three states in the 
NORTH: New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. Across segmented markets, we suspect that 
the capital market experience might be quite different for those two railroads from two different 
regions.  
Regional differences within the United States during our sample period exist on two main 
dimensions – economic development and access to capital. The strong regional differences in the 
economic development are exemplified by the relative poverty of the post-Civil War SOUTH, on 
the one hand, and the dynamism of the industrialized NORTH and CENTRAL regions, on the 
other (Mitchener and McLean, 1999; Klein and Crafts, 2012). In addition, access to capital is 
proxied by the substantially greater distance from the SOUTH and WEST regions to the major 
financial centers than that of the CENTRAL and NORTH regions. In contrast, there are no obvious 
cross-regional bonding effects. Such regional differences in economic development and access to 
capital may manifest themselves in regional segmentation effects. To test for these effects, we 
examine regional variation in yields using the matched bond sample sorted by region.  
Panel A of Table 7 reports the number of matched bond-year observations for each region, 
as well as the respective means and medians of the matched bond yield spreads for each market in 
percentage points. Out of 848 observations, 187 belong to NORTH, 207 to CENTRAL, 168 to 
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SOUTH, and 286 to WEST. Mean New York yield spreads were lower in NORTH (1.47 percent) 
and CENTRAL (1.58 percent) than SOUTH (1.90 percent) and WEST (1.94 percent). The panel 
also reports yield premia by region, defined as the difference between the mean New York and 
London yield spreads of the matched bonds with their corresponding t-statistics. While the average 
bond yield spreads in New York were higher than in London for railroads in each region, the 
difference in bond yield spreads varied across regions as seen in average differences of 1 bp, 2 bp, 
6 bp, and 8 bp for NORTH, CENTRAL, SOUTH, and WEST, respectively. These premia are 
suggestive of the regional segmentation effects we expect with smaller yield premia for bonds of 
railroads from the NORTH and CENTRAL regions (1-2 bp) compared to larger premia in the 
SOUTH and WEST regions (6-8 bp). In other words, the railroads from more remote regions of 
the United States benefitted more from a bond listing in London than did railroads from the more 
developed regions by 4 to 7 bp.  
Panel B of Table 7 shows how the yield spreads and premia varied over three sample period 
decades: the 1880s (1879-1890), the 1890s (1891-1900), and the 1900s (1901-1913). The last 
column presents for each region a test of the difference in the mean yield premium for the 1900s 
compared to that for the 1880s and its t-statistic. The panel reveals two important patterns. First, 
when we decompose the overall downward trend in the premium observed in Figure 3 Plot B, the 
magnitude of the decline varies by region. We find that there was only a very small decline in the 
premium in SOUTH from 7 bp to 5 bp. The decline in WEST was larger from 11bps to 7 bp, but 
it is statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the premium in NORTH dropped by 8 bp from 9 
bp to 1 bp (t-stat = 3.79) and in CENTRAL by 5 bp from 6 bp to 1 bp (t-stat = 2.90).  
Second, when we compare the decade differences in premium with the NORTH we note 
that the effects were more pronounced for the SOUTH and WEST railroads than for the 
CENTRAL railroads. In the 1880s, 1890s, and 1900s, the difference between CENTRAL and 
NORTH was almost zero and is statistically insignificant. In comparison, the differences between 
the premia for NORTH railroads and those for SOUTH and WEST railroads were much more 
pronounced in the last decade of the sample than the first. These results imply both cross-sectional 
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and time-series variation in the cost of capital across U.S. regions over our sample period with 
firms from the less developed SOUTH and WEST regions on average enjoying larger gains from 
foreign listing than those experienced by firms in the more developed NORTH and CENTRAL 
regions. Over time this cross-sectional variation increased. While the gains from London listing 
for firms from SOUTH and WEST declined marginally, they remained significant; in contrast, 
those for firms in NORTH and CENTRAL disappeared towards the end of our sample period. 
To examine the regional segmentation effects more robustly, we turn to a full panel 
regression setting. Table 8 reports the test results. The dependent variable is the difference in the 
bond yield spread between New York and London for every year in which we are able to match a 
bond. We define three indicator variables for three of the regions CENTRAL, SOUTH, and WEST 
such that the benchmark region for the coefficients on these variables is the NORTH region. 
Regression (1) includes two bond control variables: Years-to-Maturity and Default that are 
included to capture any systematic variation in cross-market premia that could be due to variation 
in how bond characteristics are priced. In this specification, the coefficient estimates of the 
SOUTH and WEST regional indicators are positive and highly significant with an estimate of 3 
bp for the SOUTH and 5 bp for the WEST. This confirms a much larger average yield premium 
for railroads from the SOUTH or WEST compared to those from NORTH. In Regression (2), we 
include a time variable and interaction terms between the time dummy and each of the three 
regional dummies. The coefficient on Time is negative and significant, implying a strong decline 
in the premia for the NORTH railroad bonds over time. The interactions of the time dummy and 
the regional dummies generate statistically insignificant coefficients for CENTRAL and WEST, 
suggesting a general trend for premia to decline in those two regions as well. However, a positive 
and significant value on SOUTH × Time implies that premium in this region did not decline in 
line with the other three regions. 
The first two regressions in Table 8 provide substantial support for the notion that the New 
York – London premium varies directly with the regional remoteness of a railroad from these two 
markets. To test this conjecture directly, in Regressions (3-4), we replace our four regional 
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dummies with a continuous firm-level distance variable (Distance), defined as the distance 
between the Principal Office of each railroad and New York City in thousands of miles. We find 
a positive and highly significant coefficient on Distance. Its point estimate signifies that for every 
1,000 miles the main office of a railroad was more distant from New York, the greater was the 
New York – London premium by about 2.8 bp. In Regression (4), we also interact Distance with 
Time and find that the coefficient on this term is negative and highly significant. This confirms 
that over our study period the cost of capital gains attributable to a London listing became less 
sensitive to the distance of the railroad’s principal office from New York. 
 
4. Explaining the Results  
In our tests, we observe two distinct patterns in the financial benefits accruing to U.S. 
railroad companies from a cross-listing in London during the 1873-1913 period. The first is the 
time-series trend that shows a decrease in bond yield spreads across all exchanges and a substantial 
reduction in the yield premium associated with a listing in New York as opposed to London. The 
second is the cross-regional difference in borrowing costs. How might we explain these market 
segmentation effects? We see two possible explanations: time-series and cross-regional variation 
in arbitrage costs or information costs. 
Arbitrage costs have been proposed as the source of differential prices in other contexts. 
Our finding that two matched securities trade at different prices in different markets is similar to 
an existing literature that documents price differences across markets in securities offering 
identical cash flows. For example, Rosenthal and Young (1990), Froot and Dabora (1999), and De 
Jong, Rosenthal, and Van Dijk (2009) find such effects among Siamese twin stocks and Gagnon 
and Karolyi (2010) find such effects among cross-listed stocks. These authors suggest that price 
differences are explained by such cross-market factors as arbitrage cost frictions, investor 
sentiment, and portfolio constraints. We extend this literature by adding an additional example – 
price differences among cross-listed bonds. We show that bonds with identical cash flow promises 
can trade at different prices in different markets for sustained periods of time.  
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Although we do not explicitly test for this, our observed bond yield differences may also 
be explained by the time series and cross-sectional variation in arbitrage costs. Since our matched 
bond sample is fungible (with the exception of only four bonds), and these bonds could be traded 
in either market, the average New York – London yield premium of 4.7 bp across the whole sample 
period (Table 7, Panel A) could capture the costs of arbitrage between the two locations.  
Historians have testified to the importance of transatlantic arbitrage in forcing convergence 
of New York and London bond yields, particularly in the second half of our sample period. Whilst 
arbitrage operations began to develop after the transatlantic cable was established in 1866 (Michie, 
1987: 187-9), the extent of arbitrage activity was modest and concentrated on the most actively 
traded U.S. railroad stocks. As communication improved, arbitrage became less risky. By 1900, 
there were a dozen firms engaged in transatlantic arbitrage, increasing to twenty by 1913 (Huebner, 
1922: 87). This increase in arbitrage activity appears consistent with our data. First, the mean 
difference in New York – London bond yields settled down at around 0 to 5 bp from the late 1890s 
(Tables 4 and 5 or Figure 3). Second, the decline in the mean difference of the matched (and 
fungible) bond sample from 7.6 bp in the 1880s to 3.6 bp in the 1900s (Table 7, Panel B) could 
also reflect falling arbitrage costs over time. 
Following Merton (1987), changes in information costs can also explain the observed 
patterns in cross-listing effects. In our historical setting, we suggest two possible proxies for 
information cost: the cross-sectional and time-series variation in telegraph communication and 
immigration rates from the United Kingdom to the United States. Importantly, telegraph lines were 
constructed along railroad tracks (Thompson, 1947). Figure 4 shows the telegraph communication 
rates between London and selected centers of our four U.S. regions: New York for NORTH, 
Chicago for CENTRAL, the average of Atlanta and New Orleans for SOUTH, and San Francisco 
for WEST, between 1870 and 1913. The rates represent the cost of transmitting the first 10 words 
of a message. The source data for London to New York is from the Historical Statistics of the 
United States: Colonial Times to 1970 Part 2, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1975, based on 
documents from the U.S. Federal Communications Commission and other sources specified in the 
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report. The rates from New York to Chicago and San Francisco, as well as the equally-weighted 
average of the rates from New York to Atlanta and New Orleans are from Honsowetz (2014). The 
rates from London to Chicago, San Francisco, and Atlanta/New Orleans are estimated by adding 
the London – New York rate to the rate between the destination city and New York. Data points 
between some observations are interpolated. 
The decline in telegraph rates graphed in Figure 4 is dramatic and highlights the extent of 
the communication technology shock during this period. This decline coincides relatively closely 
with the reduction in the New York – London bond yield difference over our sample period. We 
observe that the majority of the decline in both the premium and telegraph communication rates 
occurred in the first half of our sample period. This relation between the premium and 
communication costs is consistent with the increasing market integration between the United 
States and the United Kingdom during this time period, even though some studies find substantial 
integration between these two markets before the Civil War (Sylla, Wilson, and Wright, 2006). 
As the costs of information transmission between the United States and London fell, Figure 
4 also shows that a clear ordering of the relative costs across the four U.S. regions, reflecting 
geographic distance from Britain, was preserved. The cheapest rate was to New York, while the 
most expensive was to San Francisco. The implication is that it was cheaper for British investors 
to access information regarding their investments in railroads from the more proximate NORTH 
and CENTRAL regions than from the relatively distant SOUTH and especially WEST regions. 
These differential information costs also affect the relative costs of arbitrage between the two 
markets across regions. 
The regional variation in information costs may also reflect variation in cultural ties 
between Britain and these four regions of the United States. Cultural factors may be related to 
financial and economic outcomes. For instance, Grinblatt, and Keloharju (2001) find the existence 
of cultural and language preferences in investors’ portfolio holdings. Moreover, Algan and Cahuc 
(2010) show a causal effect of trust on economic growth using the inherited trust of descendants 
of U.S. immigrants as a measure of inherited trust in their country of origin. We propose that those 
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U.S. regions with a larger number of British immigrants were more likely to enjoy stronger ties to 
their home country, other things equal. Indeed, using the immigration information from the census 
data of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) at the University of Minnesota, we 
find that NORTH was the region most settled by British immigrants and CENTRAL was the 
second most settled.14 The suggestion then is that the stronger cultural linkages of the NORTH and 
CENTRAL regions with the United Kingdom could help ameliorate any information gaps for 
British investors. 
The impact of geographic distance and cultural ties on information costs is reinforced by 
that of economic distance. There were large economic disparities across the four main regions of 
the United States during this time period. At one extreme, income per capita in the SOUTH 
remained at only half the national average; at the other, the NORTH and CENTRAL regional 
economies together constituted the economically important manufacturing belt of the United 
States. Concepts in economic geography have been employed to understand how it is that industrial 
activity becomes heavily concentrated and flourishes in a single region (Krugman, 1991; Dougal, 
Parsons, and Titman, 2015). The manufacturing belt is a prime example of such a regional 
concentration. In 1900, it accounted for four-fifths of U.S. industrial output despite covering only 
one-sixth of the national land area (Klein and Crafts, 2012). All but two of the 18 states constituting 
the belt were in the NORTH and CENTRAL regions. 15  Hence, these two regions possessed 
enormous economic power in that period, which in turn had a direct effect on the strength of their 
trade relations with the United Kingdom. Sarkissian and Schill (2004) argue that in an international 
setting economic and industrial closeness between markets plays a large role in cross-country 
investments along with geographic distance.  
In sum, the differences in information costs between U.S. regions and the United Kingdom 
during our sample period were driven by geographic, cultural, and economic factors. Hence, 
                                                        
14 In 1870, British immigrants settling in each of NORTH, CENTRAL, WEST and SOUTH regions as a proportion 
of all British immigrants into the United States were 50, 29, 16 and 5 percent respectively. 
15 The other two states were in the SOUTH (Virginia and West Virginia) and none were in the WEST regions (Klein 
and Crafts, 2012). 
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relatively higher communication costs, weaker cultural ties, as well as weaker economic and trade 
links of the SOUTH and WEST regions with the United Kingdom compared to the NORTH and 
CENTRAL regions most likely contributed to higher information costs faced by British investors 
in U.S. railroads listed in New York from SOUTH and WEST. These frictions in turn explain the 
relatively larger segmentation effects upon the railroads from the SOUTH and WEST regions 
evidenced by their observed larger New York – London bond yield premia. Since British investors 
faced larger frictions trading SOUTH and WEST region securities in New York, they were willing 
to pay more for the diversification benefits which arose when railroad securities from these remote 
regions listed in London. Over time, as information costs and the accompanying segmentation 
effects diminished for the less remote areas of the United States, the premia for NORTH and 
CENTRAL railroad bonds decreased practically to zero. In contrast, due to the higher 
segmentation of SOUTH and WEST from London, the premium for railroad bonds from those 
regions remained sizable, albeit decreasing somewhat in the case of the relatively faster developing 
WEST region. 
Although we are not able to definitively identify the channel that is at the root of the New 
York – London yield premium, we provide some circumstantial evidence that is consistent with 
either an arbitrage cost or information cost explanation. The full explanation may include a 
combination of the two. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Markets can be segmented by a variety of factors, including geography and transaction 
costs. We study segmentation between the United States and the United Kingdom in a bond market 
setting over several decades prior to the World War I. We find significant time-series and cross-
regional differences in the impact of foreign bond listing activity on corporate borrowing costs 
between 1873 and 1913 for a sample of U.S. firms. Our results are consistent with Merton (1987). 
We observe substantial foreign listing activity in London among U.S. railroads from all regions 
that peaked around 1900, with bonds being the preferred security for foreign placements. New 
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York-listed U.S. railroads exhibited a bond yield premium compared to London-listed U.S. 
railroads of 20 bp in the 1870s. Over the subsequent 40 years this premium declined to effectively 
zero. This decline is consistent with a substantial reduction in market segmentation between the 
United States and the United Kingdom over this period. We do not find that a London cross-listing 
was of much help to U.S. railroads in mitigating the cost of capital impact of the frequent financial 
crises in this period. 
Our results show that those U.S. railroads that access British investors via a London listing 
benefitted from a lower cost of capital in the first part of our sample period and this benefit 
disappeared over time. Furthermore, this benefit evolved differently over time across regions. The 
NORTH and CENTRAL regions delivered a larger decline in their premia compared to the 
SOUTH and WEST regions as time passed. In fact, by the 1900s the premia practically disappeared 
for the NORTH and CENTRAL railroad bonds. We suggest that this regional variation in the gains 
from cross-listing was related to differences in information costs between railroads and British 
investors driven by the geographic, economic, and cultural distances from Britain. We also accept 
that arbitrage costs provide an alternative channel for explaining these results. Our findings 
illustrate in a novel historical setting how the decline in market segmentation of two of the world’s 
major capital markets over a century ago provided cost of capital gains to United States railroad 
firms, particularly in the most developed regions, as well as portfolio diversification opportunities 
to London investors.  
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Classification of U.S. regions 
 
 
Region Name Constituent States 
NORTH:  
     New England Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont 
     Middle Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania 
CENTRAL:  
    Central Northern  Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin    
SOUTH:  
     South Atlantic  Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia 
     Gulf & Mississippi Valley Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee 
WEST:  
     Northwestern  Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming 
     Southwestern  Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas 
     Pacific  Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington 
 
This table classifies all U.S. states into four U.S. regions using regional designations of the Poor’s Manuals. Railroad 




Frequency distribution of U.S. railroad listings 
 
 
  New York Listings    London Foreign Listings 
 Total Firms Firms Bond Stock Bond First    Firms Bond Stock Bond First 
NORTH 50 35 28 26 0.49    31 31 9 0.94 
CENTRAL 58 46 43 27 0.65    30 30 11 0.90 
SOUTH 32 20 19 13 0.90    21 21 5 0.95 
WEST 56 42 41 24 0.86    35 35 16 1.00 
Total 196 143 131 90 0.71    117 117 41 0.95 
 
This table provides a frequency distribution of the types of securities listings for a sample of U.S. railroads on the 
New York and London Stock Exchanges from 1873 to 1913. The sample is defined as all U.S. railroads with a bond 
or ordinary stock listing in New York or London based on the Commercial and Financial Chronicle and the Investors 
Monthly Manual. The regions are defined in Table 1. We assign each railroad to a region based on the location of its 





Summary statistics of characteristics of U.S. and British railroads  
 
 
Panel A: Sample characteristics for U.S. and British railroads by listing location 
 U.S. Railroads 
   
 New York only  London only  New York / London  British Railroads 
 Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean 
Revenue 1,594 4.13  535 5.23  1,556 20.4    
Assets 1,504 31.5  499 49.16  1,518 143.8  1,498 92.1 
Revenue growth 1,491 0.072  487 0.106  1,511 0.075    
Asset growth 1,400 0.042  449 0.045  1,471 0.045    
ROA 1,415 0.046  458 0.036  1,475 0.051    
 
 
Panel B: Sample characteristics for U.S. railroads by region 
    Mean 
 Obs.  All NORTH CENTRAL SOUTH WEST 
Firm characteristics:        
Revenue 4,157  10.24 13.52 9.08 7.25 10.29 
Assets  3,881  77.6 89.51 60.9 59.5 94.2 
Revenue growth 3,876  0.085 0.068 0.075 0.088 0.107 
Asset growth 3,601  0.049 0.039 0.046 0.060 0.054 
ROA 3,640  0.047  0.055 0.050 0.042 0.039 
Bond characteristics:        
Gold 3,003  0.55 0.59 0.37 0.64 0.65 
Sterling 3,003  0.11 0.19 0.08 0.06 0.08 
Default 3,003  0.013 0.021 0.010 0.004 0.014 
Years-to-Maturity 3,003  46.0 48.3 40.2 51.5 46.8 
Yield 3,003  4.81 4.64 4.88 4.87 4.87 






Table 3 (continued) 
 
 
This table provides summary statistics for the sample of U.S. and British railroads from 1873 to 1913. Panel A and B 
give the summaries across U.S. stock exchanges and across regions respectively. The regions are defined in Table 1. 
The variables are defined as follows: Revenue is the total revenue reported in the Poor’s Manuals in millions of U.S. 
dollars. Assets is the total assets in millions of U.S. dollars. ROA is the difference of total revenue and operating 
expenses divided by the total assets. Revenue (Asset) Growth is, respectively, the current total revenue (assets) divided 
by the lagged revenue (assets) less unity. Gold is an indicator variable, which equals to unity if the bond is redeemable 
for gold, and zero otherwise. Sterling is an indicator variable, which equals to unity if the bond is denominated in 
pounds sterling, and zero otherwise. Default is an indicator variable which equals to unity in any year when a railroad 
is in default on its bonds according to the Stock Exchange Year Book and zero otherwise. Years-to-Maturity is equal 
to the number of years until the bond is stated to mature, as indicated by the price source or Poor’s Manual. Gold, 
Sterling, and Years-to-Maturity are taken from descriptions in the source documents. Yield refers to the current yield 
defined as the coupon payment divided by the prevailing end of year bond price. Yields are adjusted for accrued 
interest for New York bonds from 1909. Spread is the yield less the prevailing yield on the long-dated British 
government bond. For British railroads, assets are reported as the total of book debt and equity capital and converted 
to U.S. dollars at an exchange rate of USD4.87 = GBP1. British railroads typically issued perpetual bonds, therefore, 





Characteristics of U.S. and British railroad bond yield spreads across listing exchanges, 1873-1913 
 
 
 U.S. Railroads     
 New York  London    British Railroads 
 Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean  New York – London  Obs. Mean U.S. – British, London  
1873 16  4.03   12  3.57   0.45  26 0.89 2.68*** 
1874 18  3.56   13  2.85   0.72***  26 0.90 1.95*** 
1875 18  3.39   15  2.80   0.59**  27 0.99 1.81*** 
1876 18  3.35   16  2.97   0.37  26 1.03 1.94*** 
1877 21  3.37   15  3.05   0.32  26 1.07 1.98*** 
1878 21  3.10   19  3.04   0.06  26 1.05 1.99*** 
1879 22  2.92   21  2.53   0.39*  27 0.89 1.64*** 
1880 31  2.64   23  2.25   0.39*  27 0.79 1.45*** 
1873-1880 165 3.22  134 2.82  0.40***  211 0.95 1.87*** 
1881 27  2.51   26  2.23   0.28  30 0.76 1.47*** 
1882 33  2.70   24  2.27   0.43**  33 0.79 1.48*** 
1883 34  2.65   28  2.29   0.36*  37 0.82 1.48*** 
1884 35  2.71   31  2.40   0.32  39 0.72 1.68*** 
1885 39  2.36   29  2.05   0.31*  39 0.74 1.31*** 
1886 41  2.21   33  1.94   0.27  39 0.71 1.23*** 
1887 40  2.27   34  2.04   0.23  39 0.69 1.35*** 
1888 51  2.09   44  2.02   0.07  39 0.47 1.55*** 
1889 57  2.16   46  2.11   0.05  35 0.51 1.60*** 
1890 52  2.22   48  2.18   0.04  41 0.50 1.73*** 
1881-1890 409 2.35  343 2.14  0.21***  371 0.67 1.48*** 
1891 57  2.11   48  2.09   0.02  42 0.46 1.63*** 
1892 54  2.06   52  2.07   -0.01  44 0.45 1.62*** 
1893 51  2.31   58  2.34   -0.03  43 0.41 1.91*** 
1894 52  2.39   57  2.21   0.18  42 0.32 1.90*** 
1895 50  2.22   55  2.11   0.10  43 0.26 1.85*** 
1896 46  2.39   59  2.35   0.04  45 0.31 2.04*** 
1897 47  2.24   54  2.16   0.09  48 0.37 1.78*** 
1898 44  1.89   52  1.80   0.09  48 0.48 1.31*** 
1899 44  1.57   51  1.52   0.05  48 0.37 1.12*** 
1900 48  1.31   44  1.15   0.15  48 0.43 0.73*** 
1891-1900 493 2.06  530 2.01  0.05  451 0.39 1.61*** 
1901 38  1.08   43  1.00   0.08  51 0.42 0.59*** 
1902 40  1.14   42  1.00   0.13  51 0.42 0.57*** 
1903 38  1.35   37  1.22   0.12  49 0.69 0.52*** 
1904 38  1.19   39  1.11   0.08  48 0.65 0.46*** 
1905 37  1.26   39  1.14   0.12  46 0.69 0.44*** 
1906 35  1.23   37  1.14   0.10  45 0.68 0.46*** 
1907 31  1.37   38  1.27   0.09  44 0.72 0.56*** 
1908 35  1.18   37  1.11   0.07  43 0.76 0.35*** 
1909 37  1.18   35  1.07   0.11  42 0.78 0.29*** 
1910 32  1.06   33  0.97   0.09  41 0.73 0.24*** 
1911 34  0.98   33  0.91   0.08  41 0.67 0.24*** 
1912 34  0.99   34  0.95   0.04  39 0.69 0.26*** 
1913 32  1.07   33  1.02   0.04  36 0.76 0.27*** 
1901-1913 461 1.16  480 1.07  0.09***  576 0.66 0.41*** 
43 
 
Table 4 (continued) 
 
 
This table summarizes average bond yield spreads over the long dated British government bond of U.S. and British 
railroads for each year between 1873 and 1913. Yield refers to the current yield defined as the coupon payment divided 
by the prevailing end of year bond price. “New York – London” is the difference between the mean yield for U.S. 
firms listed in New York less the mean yield for U.S. firms listed in London. “U.S. – British, London” is the difference 
between the mean yield for U.S. firms listed in London less the mean yield for U.K. firms listed in London. Where a 
railroad has more than one bond listed, we select the bond with the longest maturity. The U.S. regions are defined in 




 Table 5  
Aggregate regression estimates: All U.S. railroad bond yield spreads 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FBond -0.116*** -0.111*** -0.056*** -0.297*** -0.304***  
 (5.73) (5.52) (3.37) (4.59) (4.02)  
FBond_1870s      -0.203*** 
      (3.21) 
FBond_1880s      -0.180*** 
      (6.01) 
FBond_1890s      -0.040 
      (1.54) 
FBond_1900s      0.006 
      (0.26) 
Gold 0.078*** 0.070*** -0.031 -0.050* -0.047* -0.028 
 (3.74) (3.29) (1.39) (1.82) (1.75) (1.23) 
Sterling -0.166*** -0.196*** -0.126*** -0.091** -0.081* -0.063* 
 (4.85) (4.99) (3.59) (2.03) (1.85) (1.71) 
Default 0.257*** 0.288*** 0.078 0.209*** 0.118* 0.080 
 (3.46) (3.74) (1.28) (2.89) (1.66) (1.33) 
Years-to-Maturity -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (12.87) (7.32) (16.39) (12.41) (13.01) (16.50) 
Log (Assets)  -0.109*** -0.088*** -0.111*** -0.127*** -0.097*** 
  (12.15) (3.30) (3.45) (4.02) (3.64) 
Asset Growth  0.021 -0.055 -0.078 -0.096* -0.058 
  (0.37) (1.23) (1.46) (1.85) (1.31) 
ROA  -4.107*** -2.336*** -4.550*** -4.234*** -2.392*** 
  (11.54) (5.38) (9.27) (8.83) (5.53) 
Time    -0.045*** -0.041***  
    (24.65) (21.63)  
FBond × Time    0.008*** 0.008***  
    (4.18) (3.98)  
Crisis     0.040***  
     (7.91)  
FBond × Crisis      0.0005  
     (0.06)  
Intercept 4.116*** 5.569*** 5.667*** 5.312*** 5.277*** 5.818*** 
 (44.92) (38.63) (17.22) (14.06) (14.30) (17.69) 
Fixed Effects Year Year Firm/Year Firm Firm Firm/Year 
Obs. 3,015 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 




Table 5 (continued) 
 
 
This table provides regression results for the sample of bond yields for U.S. railroads listed in New York and London 
from 1873 to 1913. The dependent variable Spread is the yield less the prevailing yield on British government bonds. 
Time is equal to the year less 1873. FBond is an indicator variable which equals to unity if the firm has a bond foreign 
listing in London in the year and zero otherwise. The fixed effect variables are defined as either Year (annual) fixed 
effects or firm fixed effects. We also include controls for OffGold (fixed effect for the pre-1879 period, when the U.S. 
dollar was not yet fixed against gold and the sterling pound, and interaction of pre-1879 period with Sterling) and Ex-
Day for London bonds with coupon dates at the end of the calendar year. The last regression contains interaction 
variables for the years of 1870s (1873-80), 1880s, 1890s, and 1900s (including 1910-1913). The Crisis variable is 
taken from the annual default rates for U.S. railroads in Figure 1 by Giesecke, Longstaff, Schaefer, and Strebulaev 
(2011). It is meant to model the time-varying credit-market conditions in the United States. Other variables are defined 
in Table 3. The absolute value t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 




Table 6  
Determinants of U.S. railroad bond cross-listings in London  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Asset Growth 1.233***  1.186*** 1.234*** 
 (9.42)  (9.50) (9.89) 
ROA -2.287  -2.572 -6.490 
 (0.20)  (0.24) (1.26) 
Default 1.351  1.095 1.136 
 (3.23)  (1.94) (2.05) 
NYSE Listing -1.063***  -1.139*** -1.112*** 
 (11.60)  (12.69) (11.49) 
Diff (New York – London)  4.768*** 4.472*** 4.590*** 
  (12.38) (8.37) (8.09) 
Diff (U.S. – British)  1.208 1.286 2.020* 
  (1.93) (1.73) (3.22) 
Crisis  0.028 0.056 -0.160 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.09) 
GDP(U.S.)/GDP(U.K.)  0.664 0.842 1.203 
  (0.13) (0.18) (0.36) 
Region_Track_Growth  18.431*** 14.672** 13.015 
  (11.80) (5.87) (4.38) 
SW_1870s  -1.401* -1.785 -1.430 
  (2.97) (2.63) (1.70) 
Intercept -3.554 *** -23.23*** -18.589*** -16.69*** 
 (135.6) (17.35) (8.78) (6.70) 
Fixed effects No No No Firm 
Obs. 3,318 3,538 3,239 3,239 
 
This table provides logistic regression results for the sample of bond listings for U.S. railroads listed in New York and 
London from 1873 to 1913. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is listed in 
London during that year. Time is equal to the year less 1873. The NYSE Listing variable is equal to one if the firm is 
listed in New York during the previous year. Diff (New York – London) is the change in the annual New York less 
London yield difference from Table 4. Diff (U.S. – British) is the average annual difference between U.S. and British 
railroad bond yields listed in London from Table 4. The Crisis variable is taken from the annual default rates for U.S. 
railroads in Figure 1 by Giesecke, Longstaff, Schaefer, and Strebulaev (2011). GDP(U.S.)/GDP(U.K.) is the annual 
change in the GDP of the United States divided by the GDP of the United Kingdom. Region_Track_Growth is the 
annual change in the annual growth rate in the total mileage of all railroad tracks in a given U.S. region. SW_1870s is 
an indicator variable that equals one for U.S. railroads originating from the SOUTH and WEST regions in the 1870s, 
and is zero otherwise. Other variables are defined in Table 3. All independent variables have been lagged in these tests 
by one year. The Wald chi-square statistic for the coefficient is reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 






Summary statistics for matched bonds across U.S. regions 
 
 
Panel A: Bond yield spreads across regions 
 ALL NORTH CENTRAL SOUTH WEST 
Obs. 848 187 207 168 286 
New York      
      Mean 1.740 1.470 1.584 1.897 1.937 
      Median 1.594 1.304 1.657 1.906 1.700 
London      
      Mean 1.694 1.457 1.564 1.842 1.854 
      Median 1.550 1.342 1.602 1.760 1.633 
Diff (New York – London) 0.047*** 0.013* 0.020*** 0.055** 0.083*** 
 (13.06) (1.86) (2.98) (7.81) (11.12) 
 
 
Panel B: Regional bond yield spread differences over time  
 1880s 1890s 1900s 1900s – 1880s 
ALL     
      Obs. 169 327 346  
      Mean 0.076 0.037 0.036 -0.040*** 
    (3.00) 
NORTH     
      Obs. 27 69 91  
      Mean 0.088 -0.007 0.005 -0.083*** 
    (3.79) 
CENTRAL     
      Obs. 55 80 72  
      Mean 0.064 -0.004 0.012 -0.052*** 
    (2.90) 
SOUTH     
      Obs. 34 79 55  
      Mean 0.070 0.053 0.047 -0.023 
    (1.36) 
WEST     
      Obs. 59 99 128  
      Mean 0.108 0.090 0.067 -0.041 
    (1.58) 
Diff (CENTRAL – NORTH) -0.024 0.003 0.007  
 (0.97) (0.18) (0.52)  
Diff (SOUTH – NORTH) -0.018 0.060*** 0.042***  
 (0.79) (3.96) (2.80)  
Diff (WEST – NORTH) 0.020 0.096*** 0.062***  




Table 7 (continued)  
 
 
This table provides the summary statistics for the difference in New York and London yield spreads for the matched 
bond sample of U.S. railroads from 1875 to 1913 across regions. The U.S. regions are defined in Table 1. Panel A 
reports the number of firms that maintain bond listings in both New York and London, their number of observations, 
the respective mean and median bond yields in percentage points. Diff (New York – London) is the difference in mean 
bond yields with the corresponding absolute t-statistics. Panel B reports the summary statistics of bond yield spread 
differences across U.S. regions by decade. 1900s – 1880s is a test of the difference in matched bond means for each 
region between 1900s and 1880s and its absolute t-statistic. Diff (CENTRAL – NORTH), Diff (SOUTH – NORTH), 
and Diff (WEST – NORTH) indicate the difference in means tests between the CENTRAL, SOUTH, and WEST 
regions, respectively, and NORTH with the corresponding absolute t-statistics. *, **, and *** denote statistical 





Aggregate regression estimates: Regional bond yield spread differences for matched bonds 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CENTRAL 0.006 0.021   
 (0.60) (0.71)   
SOUTH 0.030*** 0.021   
 (2.70) (0.71)   
WEST 0.047*** -0.044   
 (4.98) (1.35)   
Time  -3.200***  -1.380** 
  (3.72)  (2.31) 
CENTRAL × Time  -1.120   
  (0.95)   
SOUTH × Time  2.622**   
  (2.03)   
WEST × Time   0.115   
  (0.11)   
Distance   0.028*** 0.070*** 
   (5.32) (5.84) 
Distance × Time    -1.490*** 
    (3.20) 
Years-to-Maturity 0.787*** 0.583*** 0.931*** 0.755*** 
 (6.00) (4.34) (7.13) (5.69) 
Default 0.036 0.024 0.048 0.039 
 (1.18) (0.77) (1.57) (1.28) 
Intercept -0.021 0.092*** -0.024 0.030* 
 (0.93) (3.83) (1.08) (1.77) 
Fixed Effects Year/Ex-Day Ex-Day Year/Ex-Day Ex-Day 
Obs. 848 848 848 848 
Adj. R2 0.227 0.159 0.225 0.165 
 
This table provides regression results for the difference in New York and London yield spreads of the matched bond 
sample of U.S. railroads from 1875 to 1913. The U.S. regions are defined in Table 1. The dependent variable is the 
end-of-year difference in the prevailing yield between each pair of New York and London listed bonds. Time is the 
number of years since 1875. Distance is defined as the distance in 1000s of miles between New York City and the 
location of the railroad’s Principal Office. Ex-Day captures a fixed effect for London bonds with coupon dates at the 
end of the calendar year. The coefficients on Time are multiplied by 1,000. The absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. 






Plot A: 1870 
 
 
Plot B: 1880 
 
 
Plot C: 1890 
 
Figure 1. Historical railroad maps of the United States. This figure shows the U.S. railroad maps in 1870 (Plot A), 
1880 (Plot B), and 1890 (Plot C). The source: “American Railroads: Their Growth and Development,” The Association 







Figure 2. Frequency of railroad bonds listed in London and New York. This figure shows the number of U.S. 
railroads with bonds listed in each of New York and London, and the number of British railroads with bonds listed in 


































































Plot B: New York – London mean difference in bond yields 
 
 
Figure 3. Matched bonds listed in both New York and London. This figure shows the number of bonds and the 
difference in the yield of identical bonds traded contemporaneously in both New York and London between 1879 and 
1913 for the sample of 45 railroads. Plot A gives the yearly frequency distribution of the number of such bonds traded 
in both cities. Plot B shows the corresponding difference (in percent) between New York and London bond yield 



























































Figure 4. Telegraph communication rates from London by destination city. This figure shows the telegraph 
communication rates from London to the centers of four U.S. regions. Rates are the cost of transmitting the first 10 
words of any message. The source data for London to New York is published in the Historical Statistics of the United 
States: Colonial Times to 1970 Part 2, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1975, based on documents from the U.S. 
Federal Communications Commission and other sources specified in the report. The rates from New York to Chicago, 
San Francisco, and the average of the rates from New York to Atlanta and New Orleans are from Honsowetz (2014). 
The rates from London to Chicago and to San Francisco and the average of the rates from London to Atlanta and New 
Orleans are estimated by adding the London – New York rate to the rate between the destination city and New York. 
Data points between some observations are interpolated. 
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